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Anonymity is often offered in economic experiments in order to eliminate observer
effects and induce behavior that would be exhibited under private circumstances.
However, anonymity differs from privacy in that interactants are only unaware of
each others’ identities, while having full knowledge of each others’ actions. Such
situations are rare outside the laboratory and anonymity might not meet the
requirements of some participants to psychologically engage as if their actions were
private. In order to explore the impact of a lack of privacy on prosocial behaviors, I
expand on a study reported in Dana et al. (2006) in which recipients were left
unaware of the Dictator Game and given donations as ‘‘bonuses’’ to their show-up
fees for other tasks. In the current study, I explore whether differences between a
private Dictator Game (sensu Dana et al. (2006)) and a standard anonymous one
are due to a desire by dictators to avoid shame or to pursue prestige. Participants of
a Dictator Game were randomly assigned to one of four categories—one in which
the recipient knew of (1) any donation by an anonymous donor (including zero
donations), (2) nothing at all, (3) only zero donations, and (4) and only non-zero
donations. The results suggest that a lack of privacy increases the shame that
selfish-acting participants experience, but that removing such a cost has only
minimal effects on actual behavior.
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Introduction
Numerous studies suggest that participants in economic experiments are sensitive
to the presence of observers, particularly when the task is governed by social
norms [1–4]. Researchers, however, are often interested in how participants
would engage under completely private circumstances, free from any concern for
how their actions might be perceived by others. Anonymity is thus commonly
offered to participants in economic experiments as a means of eliciting private
behavior. Studies suggest that efforts to mimic private circumstances are at least
partly effective, as participants tend to increase selfish behavior as researchers offer
increasingly strong forms of anonymity [5–8], and decrease selfish behavior as
their identities and actions are made increasingly public [9, 10]. However, it is
unknown to what degree participants are still influenced by perceptions of non-
privacy, even under the strongest forms of anonymity.
Accurately assessing the efficacy of anonymity in eliciting truly private behavior
is important to a number of important debates, most notably that concerning the
evolution and maintenance of prosociality in humans. Competing theories are
largely differentiated by the importance placed on reputational motivations,
which are often inferred from observer effects [11–13]. The fact that many
participants exhibit prosocial tendencies, even under completely anonymous
conditions, is often presented as evidence that humans have a general capacity for
prosocial behaviors irrespective of reputational concerns [14, 15]. It is therefore
important to determine the degree to which residual prosocial behaviors—those
remaining even under strong forms of anonymity—are due to other-regarding
tendencies that are independent of observer effects, such as warm-glow [16], social
preferences [17], or other strong-reciprocity motivations [12], or to at least some
participants still perceiving their actions to be non-private.
A number of studies have revealed just how sensitive participants are to the
possibility of being observed [11, 18–20]. Subtle cues, such as images resembling a
pair of observing eyes, increase the frequency (although not the amounts) of
prosocial donations [19]. Natural field versions of economic experiments, in
which participants are unaware that their actions are being recorded, are the only
scenarios in which complete privacy can be replicated. Such studies present mixed
results concerning whether the more natural forms of privacy induce self-
regarding behaviors [6, 21, 22].
A major difference between the anonymity that is offered in the laboratory and
the privacy it is meant to replicate is that under anonymity, only identities are
concealed, while the actions themselves are often made known to interactants.
Such situations are exceedingly rare outside the laboratory, particularly when
considering direct prosocial actions. Indeed, it is difficult to conjure examples in
which a person might be aware that some person has directly helped, or that some
person has decided to refrain from directly helping, but not know the individual’s
identity. Private decisions about direct prosocial actions more commonly take the
form of choosing between publicly providing help (i.e. the recipient is aware of
the action and identity of the helper) or privately withholding help (i.e. the
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potential recipient is not even aware any decision has taken place). This is the case
whenever an individual has some resource that he or she could share or secretly
hoard. Therefore, the artificial contexts and the anonymity that are common to
many economic experiments might not be psychologically salient to all
participants.
A number of studies have shown that some participants are willing to pay a
small fee in order to ‘‘exit’’ a Dictator Game, in which they are simply given the
endowment (minus the fee), and the original decision of how to split the
endowment is not carried out [23–27]. If participants are indifferent to their
anonymous actions being made known to the recipient, exiting the game would
be dominated by the option to play the game and donate zero (or an amount
equal to or less than the fee). Dana et al. [23] also introduced a method in which
recipients could be left unaware of donor actions, even when non-zero donations
were made. Recipients in this ‘‘private’’ condition simply received a bonus along
with their show-up fee for a different study; the bonus was equal to the donation
provided by their paired dictator, but recipients were not told of the origin of the
bonuses. Results were suggestive that donors were less likely to give a non-zero
amount and give less overall, but with fewer than 25 participants for each
condition, the effects did not attain significance. The present study builds upon
these methods in three ways. First, this study utilizes an online community, which
allows for a quadrupling of the sample size, allowing for a much more powerful
testing of the effects. Secondly, the ‘‘exit’’ method is recreated in a natural way,
which requires the participants to devise the strategy on their own, thus
eliminating most experimenter-demand effects. Last, I explore the reputational
motivations that underlie potential differences in donation amounts between
private and anonymous conditions.
Reputational concerns can be primarily defined by an aversion to negative
effects or a desire for positive effects, depending on the marginal gains (or losses)
in either direction. For instance, little benefit might be derived from contributing
increasing amounts to a collection plate, but failing to donate something might
result in substantial reputational injury. Alternatively, an individual who refuses
to offer money to a panhandler might experience minor reputational damage, but
buying the panhandler dinner might greatly impact others’ perceptions of this
individual. The impact of failing to act is governed by the strength of a relevant
norm to offer a minimal effort and the perceived social cost of being known as
someone to have broken this norm. The cost is often directly experienced as
shame, but can also lead to real, non-affective social consequences, such as the loss
of social partners or even direct punishment [10, 27–29]. In the other direction,
individuals who go beyond the minimal norm might experience a benefit in the
form of prestige. Prestige can benefit an individual in many ways—others might
be more willing to engage socially, economically or romantically with individuals
with high prestige [30, 31]. The degree to which going beyond a norm influences
prestige, as well as the payoff of this prestige to the altruist, likely depends on a
multitude of factors and can vary from context to context and from person to
person.
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Informing others of one’s anonymous decisions might induce participants to
behave more prosocially because some still perceive a risk of experiencing shame
for failing to conform to a norm or because some still perceive an opportunity to




In a between-subjects study design, participants took part as donors in one of four
anonymous Dictator Game treatments (recipients also took part in the current
study, but were passive participants who only received donations). In the Control
treatment, participants acted as a donor in a traditional Dictator Game. Recipients
were made aware that the game had been played and the amount the donor had
decided to give. In the Private condition, the fact that the game was played and the
amount of the donor’s donation was not made known to the recipient regardless
of donation amount. Recipients paired to donors who gave zero in this treatment
simply received a show-up fee for completing basic surveys and were not told of
the Dictator Game portion. Recipients paired to donors who gave a non-zero
amount in this treatment were provided a bonus in addition to the show-up fee,
without any explanation. If the revealing of donors’ decisions evokes reputational
concerns, donors in the Private condition are expected to give less overall than
donors in the Control condition (H1).
Two additional treatments were included to explore the degree to which
participants naturally ‘‘exit’’ the game, as well as the underlying potential
motivations behind any differences between anonymous and private conditions.
In the Private-Positive condition, the fact that the game had been played and the
amount of the donor’s donation was only made known to the recipient if the
donor gave zero, while non-zero donations remained private in the manner
described for the Private condition. If participants who regularly would donate
zero experience shame for having such a decision revealed to the recipient, they
should be motivated to donate the minimum amount in order to conceal their
decision. Thus, we expect a lower frequency of zero donations and a higher
frequency of minimum non-zero donations in the Private-Positive condition
compared to the Control condition (H2). Note that the minimum non-zero
donation is equivalent to the ‘‘exit’’ decision, although participants are not
directly told that they have this option, eliminating cognitive experimenter
demand effects [32].
Finally, the Private-Zero condition is also included to explore the degree to
which an aversion to experiencing shame motivates actual donor behavior, not
simply whether shame is experienced by those who donate zero. In this condition,
the fact that the game had been played and the amount of the donor’s donation
were only made known to the recipient if the donor gave a non-zero amount,
while zero donations remained private in the manner described for the Private
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condition. If participants respond to non-private elements because of a desire to
not experience public shame for breaking a social norm against acting selfish, then
a larger proportion of participants in the Private condition (H3a) and particularly
in the Private-Zero condition (H3b) should donate zero compared to those in the
Control. While such an effect is predicted in both the Private and Private-Zero
conditions, the Private-Zero condition provides for a more sensitive test, as it is
the only private option available.
If, however, reputational concerns are defined by a desire to appear
magnanimous (i.e. prestige), participants in the Private condition who donate a
non-zero amount are expected to donate less than those who donate a non-zero
amount in the Control condition (H4a). Such an effect is also predicted in the
Private-Positive condition, although this is conflated with H2. Therefore,
participants who donate more than the non-zero minimum (5 cents) in the
Private-Positive condition are expected to donate a smaller amount than those
who donate more than the non-zero minimum in the Control condition (H4b).
Procedure
The study was conducted utilizing Amazon Mechanical Turk (mTurk), a crowd-
sourcing service provided by Amazon.com. Participants in mTurk studies are
more demographically diverse than undergraduate participant pools [33] and
differ along some axes of personality and attitudes [34]; however, they tend to
respond truthfully [35], and results of behavioral studies using mTurk are
comparable to those derived using conventional methods and participant pools
[36, 37].
The study was conducted in three separate rounds, each separated by
approximately two weeks, over the summer of 2014. Three rounds were used to
reduce the likelihood that the nature of the study would be reported on message
boards. The most common message board for this purpose, Reddit’s ‘‘Hits Worth
Turking For,’’ was monitored to ensure that this did not happen. Participants
responded to a request that read ‘‘Participate in a short economic experiment, and
then answer a short 3–5 min survey.’’ They were offered $0.10 as a show up fee.
500 participants took part in the study as Dictators. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of the four conditions, taking part in only this one condition.
They were given instructions specific to their condition and then had two chances
to correctly describe the outcomes of three scenarios, including whether the
participant would be aware of the donation. Sixty-three individuals or 12.6% of all
participants were excluded for failing to meet this criterion. An additional 54 cases
were excluded, as the individuals had participated in previous rounds or previous
versions of this study. Participants were asked to partition an endowment of $1.00
in increments of $0.05. Although this endowment is substantially lower than that
used in laboratory studies, it represents a substantial rate of return compared to
other mTurk assignments. Furthermore, previous mTurk studies have found the
distributions of Dictator Game donations of $1.00 endowments to be comparable
to those using larger endowments [37, 38]. In previous mTurk studies, however,
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posters on ‘‘Hits Worth Turking For’’ had expressed doubt concerning whether
money is actually given to recipients in such games. Therefore, the sentence, ‘‘This
will really happen—another mTurk participant will actually receive the money
you decide on,’’ was included in the instructions. After completing the Dictator
Game, participants completed a short survey covering basic demographic
information and an altruism battery adopted from the National Altruism Study
that was included in the 2002 General Social Survey [39]. Donations were given to
recipients in a separate round in the manner dictated by the condition of the
donor. Methods were approved by the Texas A&M Human Subjects Protection
Program and carried out under protocol IRB2013-0479.
Results
The samples across the four conditions do not significantly differ in gender, age,
or education (Table 1). Similarly, a composite prosociality score based on the sum
of reported frequencies of 10 different prosocial behaviors (measured along six-
point ordinal scales) did not differ across conditions (ANOVA, p50.364). The
four groups did differ in income distribution, although income was not
significantly correlated with donation amount in any of the four conditions.
Fig. 1 displays the distributions of donations across the four conditions. The
mean donations did not significantly differ among the conditions (Table 2)
(ANOVA, p50.227), although differences in their distributions approached
significance (Kruskal-Wallis, p50.081). Overall levels of donations in the Private
condition were lower than those in the Control condition, although the difference
only attained one-tailed significance using a parametric t-test (p50.071), and was
not significant using a non-parametric Mann-Whitney test (p50.140). H1 is thus
tentatively supported. Participants in the Private-Positive group were less likely to
donate zero (X254.404, p50.036) and more likely to donate the minimum non-
zero amount (X256.059, p50.014), in support of H2.
The remaining hypotheses received less support. The proportions of individuals
donating zero were higher in the Private and Private-Zero conditions compared to
the Control condition, in the directions predicted by H3a and H3b, but the
differences were not significant (respectively, X251.311, p50.252; X251.229,
p50.268). Participants in the Private condition who donated a non-zero amount
did not donate significantly more than those in the Control condition (t51.469,
p5.145; Mann-Whitney U5905, p50.233), failing to support H2a, although the
result was in the predicted direction. Similarly, participants in the Private-Positive
condition who donated more than the minimum non-zero amount (5 cents), did
not donate significantly more than those in the Control condition (t51.079,
p50.283; Mann-Whitney U5952.5, p50.381), failing to support H2b, although,
again, the result was in the predicted direction.
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics.





Control 98 0.63 31.35 $30K–$39K Associate’s 50.14
(9.40) (7.43)
Private 98 0.61 31.55 $30K–$39K Associate’s 48.91
(9.74) (6.46)
Private-Positive 94 0.62 31.45 $30K–$39K Associate’s 48.69
(10.31) (6.50)
Private-Zero 93 0.63 31.40 $40K–$49K Associate’s 49.37
(8.13) (6.15)
Pooled 383 0.62 31.44 $30K–$39K Associate’s 49.27
(9.40) (6.64)
Tests for differences among
groups (p)
0.985a 0.999b 0.022c 0.545c 0.466b
aChi-square goodness of fit.
bAnalysis of variance.
cKruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115419.t001
Fig. 1. Distribution of Dictator donations across the four conditions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115419.g001
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Discussion
The results suggest that making recipients aware of anonymous donor decisions
impacts the psychological cost to those who donate zero, but has very minor, if
any, impacts on actual donor behavior. This study replicates the results found by
studies incorporating an option to exit the game for a minor cost [23–27]—
participants in the Private-Positive condition were less likely to donate zero, and
more likely to donate the minimum positive amount, in support of H2 (Table 3).
It appears that this is indeed the impact of those who would have otherwise
donated zero instead opting to donate five cents, as the reduction in zero
donations is comparable to the augmentation in five-cent donations. Additionally,
the fact that participants devised such a strategy independently suggests that this
effect is not merely an experimenter demand effect induced by describing the exit
strategy as it has been done in previous studies. This suggests that participants
who donate zero do incur a psychological cost from their decision being revealed
to the participant, which is at least greater than the cost of donating the minimum
donation for some.
Removing this psychological cost associated with revealing the decision to
participants, however, does not appear to substantially motivate those who would
typically donate a non-zero amount to be more likely to donate zero. Participants
were not significantly more likely to donate zero in either the Private or Private-
Zero conditions compared to the control. The lack of an effect between the
Control and Private-Zero conditions is surprising, as the options presented to
participants are similar to those presented to participants in previous studies who
donated a non-zero amount and were then given the option to exit. Despite the
finding that many such participants opted to exit in these studies, those in the
Table 2. Dictator Game Donations.





Control 98 19.3 (¢) 5 48 5 37.8 50 41.4 50
(24.9) (49.0) (5.1) (22.7) (21.0)
Private 98 13.5{ 0 56 5 31.4 27.5 35.0 40
(19.5) (57.1) (5.1) (18.0) (16.1)
Private-Zero 93 18.3 0 53 1 42.6 50 43.6 50
(23.9) (57.0) (1.1) (16.8) (15.9)
Private-Pos. 94 19.3 7.5 32* 15* 29.2* 25* 36.9 50
(22.4) (34.0) (16.1) (21.7) (16.1)
Tests for differences
among groups (p)
0.227a 0.081b 0.105c ,0.001c 0.001a 0.002b 0.140a 0.178b
{p,0.10,
*p,0.05, Tests for difference from Control condition: t-test, Mann-Whitney U test, chi-square test used to test for differences in means, medians, and
proportions respectively.
aAnalysis of variance.
bKruskal-Wallis one-way analysis of variance.
cChi-square goodness of fit.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0115419.t002
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current study did not independently decide to donate zero. Caution is necessary in
declaring the null with confidence, however, as both tests result in non-significant
effects in the predicted direction. Furthermore, if we pool the Private and Control
conditions with those in the Dana et al. [23] study, the effect attains one tailed-
significance (controlling for study, logistic regression, B50.440, p50.093).
Similarly, privacy did not appear to induce participants to give significantly
lower non-zero donations. Participants who donated a non-zero amount in the
Private condition and those who donated more than the minimum non-zero
amount in the Private-Positive condition did not donate significantly more than
their counterparts in the Control condition. Thus, the reporting of donor
decisions to recipients does not appear to substantially induce participants to
pursue prestige. Again, both effects were in the predicted direction. The effects
were thus in the predicted directions for all four hypotheses relating to prestige
and shame (H3a, H3b, H4a, and H4b), and the p-values, while not significant,
might be interpreted in concert as suggestive. However, given the relatively large
sample sizes used in this study, if these effects are real, they are likely very minor.
It’s important to note that even the private conditions used in the current study
might not elicit truly private behavior in an experimental context, as decisions
must still be recorded, analyzed by the researcher, etc. Participants might therefore
still be responding to cues of non-privacy, while truly private behaviors would
trend even more towards selfishness. Alternatively, participants might be
responding to experimenter demand effects in this study and lowering their
donations because of the emphasis placed on contrived privacy rules in the
instructions of the experiment. These caveats notwithstanding, there is strong
evidence that the revealing of anonymous donor decisions to recipients increases
the psychological cost (likely in the form of shame) that selfish-acting participants
experience. Removing this cost appears to have a minor effect on overall donation
levels, although the individual contributions to this effect of more individuals
donating zero and those who donate a non-zero amount donating less were too
minor to detect, even with sample sizes approaching 100.
Table 3. Tests of Hypotheses.
Hypotheses Predicted Direction? Parametric p Non-parametric p
H1: Lower donations in Private Yes 0.140 0.071
H2: Fewer zero donations and more minimum positive donations in Private-
Positive
Yes 0.036, 0.014
H3a: More zero donations in Private Yes 0.252
H3b: More zero donations in Private-Positive Yes 0.268
H4a: Non-zero donations will be smaller in Private Yes 0.145 0.233
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